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I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal statutes governing accomplice liability are among the
most frequently invoked by state and federal prosecutors in this country.1
In 2014, in Rosemond v. United States,2 the Supreme Court issued its first
major pronouncement on the reach of complicity liability in almost thirtyfive years.3 The case arose in the context of another widely used federal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence
when a firearm is used or carried “during and in relation to” a violent or
drug trafficking offense.4 In its opinion, the Court addressed the actus reus
and mens rea required to convict an accessory in a § 924(c) prosecution.
The law surrounding accomplice liability—in particular its mens rea
requirements—has been described as “vexing,”5 “inescapably complex,”6
and “a disgrace.”7 Despite the regularity with which these issues arise in
criminal cases, the rules governing mens rea and complicity remain
surprisingly unresolved and have sparked little scholarly interest in recent
years.8 The law is particularly “sparse and conflicting” for crimes
requiring proof of some attendant circumstance.9
In attempting to fill this gap in the law and academic literature, the
remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. After the elements of
complicity are sketched out briefly in Part II, Part III describes the Court’s
ruling in Rosemond and the weapons offense that served as its focus. Parts

1. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 732 (1983) (describing
complicity as “[t]he most important source of criminal liability, excluding the offense
definition”); Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider
and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1346 (2002)
(observing that the federal law governing accomplices is “probably invoked more
frequently than any other federal criminal statute”).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014).
3. The Court’s last significant ruling on accomplice liability came in Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25–26 (1980), which allowed the conviction of an accessory
despite the principal’s acquittal in an earlier trial.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
5. Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 228
(2000).
6. Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369,
369 (1997).
7. Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser
Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 428 (2008).
8. See id. at 429 (observing that complicity has “received relatively little scholarly
attention” in this country since the mid-1980s); Weisberg, supra note 5, at 222 (pointing
out that “scant attention” has been given to accomplice liability since publication of the
Model Penal Code).
9. Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1160 (1997).
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IV and V then examine in turn two competing interpretations of § 924(c):
first, that it simply prohibits certain conduct, and second, that it contains
both a conduct and a circumstance element. Using Rosemond as the
backdrop, these two Parts also analyze the mens rea implications of each
alternative reading of the statute.
Moving beyond the confines of Rosemond, this Article recommends
that accomplice liability require proof of purpose with respect to every
conduct element of a crime. For criminal offenses that also involve an
attendant circumstance, the Article proposes that the purpose requirement
likewise extend to those circumstance elements if the actus reus of a crime
is narrowly construed as limited to the defendant’s willed movements and
all other elements of the crime are deemed attendant circumstances. On
the other hand, if criminal law draws the line between conduct and
circumstance elements such that conduct is more broadly conceived, an
accessory should be criminally liable as long as she shared the mens rea
vis-à-vis any circumstance elements necessary to convict the principal.
The Article concludes that this approach appropriately limits accessory
liability to those demonstrating sufficient culpability with respect to the
gravamen of the crime and thus preserves the rationales underlying
complicity’s imposition of a relatively onerous mens rea burden on the
prosecution.
II. COMPLICITY THEORY
Complicity is a theory of criminal liability, a method by which a
defendant is convicted of an offense actually committed by someone
else.10 Although accomplice liability is not itself a separate crime, the
prosecution must prove an actus reus and mens rea just like in any criminal
trial.11
In order to satisfy the actus reus requirement, the accomplice must have
aided or encouraged the crime.12 The accomplice’s act, like that of any
10. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.02[A][2], at 458
(6th ed. 2012).
11. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2, at 337 (2d ed.
2003).
12. See id. § 13.2(a), at 337–39. An omission contrary to legal duty also suffices
in many jurisdictions. See id. at 341–42. In addition, the Model Penal Code includes an
unsuccessful attempt to aid on the theory that separating “attempted complicity” and
“effective complicity” is “unnecessary where the crime has been committed.” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 314 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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criminal defendant, must have been a voluntary, willed movement.13 But
any voluntary act of aid or encouragement, no matter how trivial, suffices.
The prosecution is not required to establish that the crime would not have
occurred but for the accessory or that the accomplice contributed a
substantial amount of assistance.14 Rather than basing liability on the
theory that the accomplice caused the crime, the accomplice is convicted
because her voluntary association with the offense makes her blameworthy.15
Despite the relative ease with which the government is able to prove an
actus reus, the mens rea half of the equation can pose a more difficult
hurdle. Technically, complicity requires evidence of “dual intents”: intent
to assist the principal and intent regarding the target crime.16 Although
the word intent is “quite ambiguous”17 and in some contexts encompasses
both purpose and knowledge,18 here it connotes purpose. The first mens
rea is typically—though not inevitably—implicit in proof of the act of
assistance or encouragement.19 The second mens rea—the accomplice’s
intent vis-à-vis the crime committed by the principal—is a more complicated
matter.
The “canonical” articulation20 of this second mens rea requirement was
set forth by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, where the
Second Circuit held that Peoni could not be convicted of possessing
counterfeit money on the theory that he was an accomplice to the
individual who purchased the counterfeit bills from the middleman who
had bought them from Peoni.21 Reasoning that all the actions that make
one an accomplice—“even the most colorless, ‘abet’—carry an implication
of purposive attitude,” the court ruled that an accomplice must “associate

13. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 9.02[A], at 87. But cf. Weiss, supra note 1, at
1348–49 (describing this requirement in mens rea terms).
14. See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738–39 (Ala. 1894); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 314 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
15. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 354–55 (1985); Weisberg, supra note
5, at 225–26; Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1996, at 25, 31. But cf. Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and
the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 402–20 (2007) (rejecting
the premise that accomplices play no causal role in crime).
16. DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 30.05[A], at 469.
17. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01 cmt. at 305 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (observing that “the
concept of ‘intent’ has always been an ambiguous one”).
18. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.2, at 340.
19. See Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 449 (1893) (mandating that “the acts
or words of encouragement and abetting must have been used by the accused with the
intention of encouraging and abetting”; “the actual effect” of encouragement is insufficient).
20. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014).
21. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402–03 (2d Cir. 1938).
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himself with the venture, . . . participate in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about, . . . seek by his action to make it succeed.”22 On
the facts before it, the court found insufficient evidence that Peoni
intended that his buyer would in turn sell the counterfeit bills to a third
person. “[I]t was of no moment” to Peoni, the court explained, whether
his buyer “passed them himself, and so ended the possibility of further
guilty possession, or whether he sold them to a second possible passer.”23
The Supreme Court subsequently endorsed the Peoni standard in Nye
& Nissen v. United States,24 and it has been adopted in a majority of
jurisdictions.25 Criminal offenses typically call for proof of a mens rea
less culpable than purpose,26 and the law has therefore imposed a relatively
onerous mens rea burden in cases involving accomplices. Insisting on
evidence of purpose compensates for complicity’s minimal actus reus
requirement and ensures that those who may have committed minor or
equivocal acts of assistance are not held responsible for crimes they did
not intend to facilitate.27 Even an individual who knowingly aided a crime
is not deemed culpable enough for fear that a “pall would be cast on
ordinary activity if we had to fear criminal liability for what others might
do simply because our actions made their acts more probable.”28
In assessing how the various components of complicity theory fit
together, consider the following scenario: Police responding to a report of

22. Id. at 402.
23. Id. at 402–03. But cf. Weisberg, supra note 5, at 236 n.40 (arguing that Peoni
may have wanted the counterfeit bills sold to a third person, particularly if he was aware
that his buyer “generally served as middleman in counterfeit transactions”).
24. 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); see also Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248 (noting that
the Supreme Court “appropriated” the Peoni standard).
25. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 738–39 & nn.258 & 260; see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (requiring
that an accomplice act “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense”). But cf. John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice
Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237, 380–81 (2008) (arguing that
only a minority of jurisdictions actually follow this approach, given the sparse and
inconsistent case law in some states and the prevalence of the natural and probable
consequences doctrine described infra at note 60).
26. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 234 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 10.04[A][1], at 121.
27. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 312 & n.42, 314–19 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985); R.A. Duff, ‘Can I Help You?’ Accessorial Liability and the
Intention to Assist, 10 LEGAL STUD. 165, 166 (1990); Kadish, supra note 15, at 353.
28. Kadish, supra note 15, at 353. For alternative views, see infra note 145 and
accompanying text.
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an armed robbery in progress at a post office observe an individual
blocking the entrance to the building. As a result, the officers’ entry into
the post office is delayed, and the robber is able to escape through the back
exit. The individual the police encountered finds herself charged in federal
court with robbing a post office. If the defendant was asleep or was pushed
in front of the door by someone else, the assistance she provided the robber
did not constitute a voluntary act and therefore does not satisfy complicity’s
actus reus requirement.
If the defendant was blocking the entrance to the post office because
she was carrying a load of packages to be mailed and was hoping someone
would open the door for her, her presence at the scene was the result of a
voluntary act on her part. Her assistance was unintentional, however, and
therefore the first mens rea requirement is missing—and, by definition,
the second is as well. If the robber, posing as a gas company employee,
had asked the defendant to stop anyone from entering the building because
of a gas leak, the defendant purposefully assisted the principal but did not
intend for the crime of robbery to succeed and therefore lacks the second
mens rea. If, on the other hand, the defendant had agreed to act as a
lookout for the robber in return for a percentage of the proceeds, it can at
least be inferred that she had the requisite purpose for the crime to occur.
And that conclusion would not change even if her motive for participating
was to feed her children29 and even if she would have preferred to fulfill
her family obligations through less unsavory means.30
Assuming the defendant intended to assist a robbery, is the government’s
mens rea burden now satisfied? Or must the prosecution establish some
state of mind regarding the jurisdictional requirement that the items taken
in the robbery were “mail matter . . . or other property of the United
States”?31 If the prosecutor also brings charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
which imposes an enhanced sentence on any person who “uses or carries
a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime,” must the defendant have harbored some mens rea regarding the
29. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of
Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 943 (2000) (distinguishing “conscious
object[s]” from “ultimate object[s]”).
30. See Alexander & Kessler, supra note 9, at 1147 (observing that a defendant acts
purposefully even if he “hoped that he could have achieved his ends legally . . . and . . .
may truly regret that such options were not available”); Walter Wheeler Cook, Act,
Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 658 (1917) (noting that
intent can exist even where the defendant “would have been glad to avoid it”); Kenneth
W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 481 n.64 (1992) (pointing out
that “sometimes one intends to act in a certain way only as a regrettable means to a larger
end”); J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 422, 427 n.4
(1957) (arguing that consequences can be intended “whether desired or not”).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (2012).

138

KINPORTS FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 133, 2015]

10/30/2018 9:14 AM

The Elements of Complicity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

robber’s use of a weapon?32 As discussed in the following Part, that last
question reached the Supreme Court in Rosemond v. United States.33
III. SECTION 924(C) AND ROSEMOND
Section 924(c), originally enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of
1968, accounts for the greatest number of weapons charges filed by
federal prosecutors.34 It has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court
opinions and congressional amendments, as over time Congress has
“repeatedly . . . ratcheted up the penalties” prescribed by the statute.35 In
its current form, § 924(c) provides that anyone who “uses or carries a
firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of” any such offense,
must serve a mandatory five-year minimum sentence to run consecutively
with any other prison term imposed for the underlying predicate crime.36
The mandatory minimum increases to seven years if the weapon “is
brandished” and ten years if it “is discharged.”37 In addition, the statute
creates further enhanced penalties for particularly dangerous weapons and
repeat violations.38
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on § 924(c) came last
year in Rosemond. Rosemond was one of two men accompanying a
woman who was attempting to sell a pound of marijuana. When the
would-be buyers absconded with the drugs, one of the men fired at them
with a semiautomatic handgun. In support of the § 924(c) charge, the
Government argued in the alternative that Rosemond was either the

32. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
33. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (2014).
34. See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun
Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51
DUKE L.J. 1641, 1665–66 (2002). Despite the high number of § 924(c) prosecutions, the
statute is still underutilized. See id. at 1676–80; Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for
Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects
for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 53–57 (2000).
35. Beale, supra note 34, at 1668.
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2012).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (2012)
(defining the term “brandish” as “display[ing] all or part of the firearm, or otherwise
mak[ing its] presence . . . known . . . in order to intimidate [another] person”); Dean v.
United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009) (holding that the ten-year enhancement applies
even if the weapon is discharged accidentally).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)–(C) (2012).
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shooter or the other man’s accomplice.39 The federal aiding and abetting
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, punishes “as a principal” anyone who “aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures [the] commission” of a federal
crime.40 The question before the Court was what sort of act and mental
state were required to convict Rosemond as an accomplice to a § 924(c)
violation.
The Court unanimously agreed that the Government had proved the
actus reus component of accomplice liability. Although Rosemond insisted
that he aided only the drug offense and “took no action with respect to any
firearm,” the Court held that complicity’s actus reus requirement is met
by “facilitat[ion of] any part—even though not every part—of a criminal
venture.”41 “[E]very little bit helps,” Justice Kagan’s majority opinion
explained, and “a contribution to some part of a crime aids the whole.”42
As applied to § 924(c), then, the Court thought it sufficient that an accessory
“facilitated one component” of the offense—“either the drug transaction
or the firearm use (or of course both).”43
The Court was more divided on the mens rea issue. Citing both Peoni
and Nye & Nissen with approval, the majority took the position that an
accomplice must “intend[] to facilitate” “the specific and entire crime
charged” and not “some different or lesser offense.”44 Here, therefore, the
Government was required to establish that Rosemond’s intent extended to
both drug trafficking and the use of a firearm.45 Despite ostensibly
requiring proof of purpose, however, the Court went on to say that one
who “actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the
circumstances constituting the charged offense” can be convicted as an
accomplice.46 Then equating knowledge and intent, the Court observed
that a defendant who “actively participates in a criminal scheme knowing
its extent and character intends that scheme’s commission.”47 Continuing
in the same vein, the Court reasoned that an “active participant” in a drug
sale who “knows that one of his confederates will carry a gun . . . has
decided to join in the criminal venture . . . with full awareness of its
39. See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243–44 (2014) (noting that
the verdict did not specify which theory the jury adopted).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
41. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1246. But cf. Weiss, supra note 1, at 1347 n.14 (citing
conflicting federal case law on this point).
42. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1246.
43. Id. at 1247.
44. Id. at 1248; see also id. at 1251 n.10 (quoting with approval Peoni’s “distinctive
intent standard”).
45. See id. at 1248.
46. Id. at 1248–49 (emphasis added). For analysis of the case law Justice Kagan
cited in support of this point, see infra notes 88–128 and accompanying text.
47. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249 (emphases added).
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scope,” “has chosen . . . to align himself with the illegal scheme in its
entirety,” and therefore “intended the commission of . . . an armed drug
sale.”48
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justices Alito and Thomas
expressed some understandable uncertainty concerning the mens rea
burden imposed by the majority opinion. The two Justices pointed out
that the majority “refer[red] interchangeably” to both purpose and
knowledge, and they traced this confusion to “some tension” in earlier
Supreme Court cases as to which of those two mental states is necessary
for accomplice liability.49
Although Justices Alito and Thomas have a point that the Court’s
decision in Rosemond “leaves our case law in the same, somewhat
conflicted state that previously existed,”50 the majority did settle on a
fairly explicit mens rea rule for § 924(c) prosecutions: “active
participation in a drug sale” combined with “prior knowledge of the gun’s
involvement.”51 In the end, Justices Alito and Thomas seemed to agree

48. Id. (emphases added). Although this language, like the rest of the opinion,
refers to the “carrying” of a weapon, Rosemond was actually sentenced under the portion
of § 924(c) prohibiting the “discharge” of a firearm. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying
text.
49. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1253 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (contrasting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949), with Bozza v.
United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), and Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), which
are discussed infra at notes 89–123 and the accompanying text); see also Loughrin v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2398 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (taking the position that bank fraud requires only that “the objective of
the scheme as a whole is to obtain bank property” and that an accomplice can be convicted
on proof of knowledge even if she does not share that purpose).
50. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1253 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For an exhaustive discussion of the “hopelessly muddled” state of the federal law
governing mens rea and complicity, see Weiss, supra note 1, at 1373.
51. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1251. The Court, in a footnote that Justice Scalia chose
not to join, declined to reach cases involving accessories who only “incidentally facilitate”
a crime, giving as an illustration a store owner who sells a weapon to the principal
“knowing but not caring how the gun will be used.” Id. at 1249 n.8. While the Court’s
distinction between “incidental” and “active” participation is likely to create line-drawing
difficulties, the footnote focused on the amount of assistance an accessory provides (the
actus reus) and left the requisite mens rea open only for cases involving minor participants.
See id. But cf. Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Justice Kagan Writes a Primer on Aiding
and Abetting Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2014/03/opinion-analysis-justice-kagan-writes-a-primer-on-aiding-and-abetting-law/
[http://perma.cc/V6K4-YW92] (taking the position that while Rosemond “comes close to
deciding” whether an accessory must have “‘knowledge’ or ‘purpose’ to facilitate the crime,”
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with the majority that if Peoni and Nye & Nissen represent the “exclusive”
mens rea standard for accomplice liability, they only require that the
prosecution show the accessory’s “conscious object” was that “the
hypothetical drug sale (which, as the defendant knew, included the
carrying of a gun by one of the participants) go forward to completion.”52
Justices Alito and Thomas clearly parted company with the Court,
however, when it admonished that an accomplice must have “advance
knowledge” of the weapon, a prerequisite that the two Justices in the
minority called “seriously misguided.”53 But the majority was reluctant
to convict a defendant who “knows nothing of a gun until it appears at the
scene,” at which point the defendant may have already completed her role
in the scheme or may no longer have a “realistic opportunity to quit the
crime.”54 Therefore, the majority cautioned, the accomplice must have
“advance knowledge” of the gun, that is, “knowledge at a time the accomplice
can do something with it—most notably, opt to walk away.”55
This requirement of prior knowledge can be satisfied even for a
defendant who first learns of a weapon at the scene of the crime, the Court
observed, so long as the defendant “continues to participate . . . after [the]
gun [is] displayed or used by a confederate.”56 In such cases, the Court
thought a jury may “permissibly infer” the accomplice had the requisite
advance knowledge from her “failure to object or withdraw,” but it
rejected the Government’s proposed rule that “continu[ing] any act of
assisting the drug transaction” after finding out a confederate has a
weapon suffices.57 Leaving itself vulnerable to line-drawing challenges,58
the Court expressed the fear that under some circumstances simply
walking away in the middle of a crime “might increase the risk of gun
violence,” in which case awareness of the weapon “comes too late for [the
accomplice] to be reasonably able to act upon it.”59 The Court therefore
reversed Rosemond’s conviction because the trial judge’s instructions did
not require the jurors to find Rosemond had advance knowledge of the
weapon and would have allowed the jury to convict even if Rosemond
it does not “clearly answer[]” that question and interpreting footnote 8 as “leav[ing] that
murky”).
52. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1255 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
53. Id. at 1253 & n.1. For an analysis of the disagreement within the Court on this
point, see Stephen P. Garvey, Reading Rosemond, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 247–50
(2014).
54. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249.
55. Id. at 1249–50.
56. Id. at 1250 n.9.
57. Id. at 1250 & n.9 (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 1253–54 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 1251 (majority opinion).
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first became aware of the gun “when it was fired” and “took no further
action” after that point “to advance the crime.”60
The persuasiveness of the Court’s reasoning in Rosemond turns on the
proper classification of the various elements of § 924(c). As discussed
above in Part II, every criminal offense requires evidence of an actus reus
and therefore includes a conduct element.61 But some crimes also call for
proof that the defendant’s act caused a particular result or was committed
under certain circumstances.62 Like many criminal statutes, § 924(c) is
susceptible to two different interpretations. It can be viewed, as the Court
did in Rosemond, as a crime that simply prohibits certain conduct.
Alternatively, it can be read to include both a conduct and a circumstance
element. The following two Parts of this Article explore these two
contrary constructions of § 924(c) and their implications for the mens rea
burden the criminal law should impose in cases involving accomplices.
IV. PURE CONDUCT CRIMES
One plausible reading of § 924(c), adopted by the Supreme Court in
Rosemond, treats the crime as one defined solely in terms of prohibited
conduct. This Part of the Article makes the argument that although this
interpretation is supported by precedent as well as the statute’s language
and purpose, it undermines the Court’s holding that an accomplice can be
convicted on a showing she merely had advance knowledge a weapon
would be involved in the predicate offense. Instead, accomplice liability
should be limited to accessories who acted purposefully with respect to
all of a crime’s conduct elements, including, therefore, the use of the

60. Id. at 1251–52. The majority left unresolved whether a § 924(c) conviction
might in some cases be predicated on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. See
id. at 1248 n.7 (another footnote Justice Scalia did not join); Weiss, supra note 1, at 1428–
32 (citing conflicting lower court case law on this question). Another alternative route to
a § 924(c) conviction is the Pinkerton doctrine, which allows members of a conspiracy to
be convicted of substantive crimes committed by their coconspirators. See Weiss, supra
note 1, at 1432 n.421 (citing cases); see generally Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640, 647–48 (1946) (permitting coconspirator’s conviction for foreseeable offenses
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy). Neither of these options would be available
under the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 307, 312–13 & n.42
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
61. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(listing three types of “element[s] of an offense”: “conduct,” “attendant circumstances,”
and “a result of conduct”).

143

KINPORTS FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

10/30/2018 9:14 AM

firearm here. Finally, the maxim that knowledge may lead to an inference
of purpose cannot be used to justify the Court’s ruling in Rosemond.
A. Interpreting § 924(c)
With the exception of one isolated reference to circumstances, which is
addressed below in Part V.A, the Court in Rosemond quite clearly viewed
§ 924(c) as a crime defined purely in terms of prohibited conduct—in fact,
as consisting of two conduct elements. The majority referred repeatedly
to the “compound nature” of this “double-barreled crime,” which requires
proof of “two separate acts.”63 Both the acts constituting the predicate
violent or drug trafficking offense and the use of a firearm are “essential
conduct element[s]” of § 924(c), the Court observed.64
Moreover, Rosemond’s characterization of the elements of § 924(c)
cannot be dismissed as anomalous or off-the-cuff. In discussing the
proper venue for § 924(c) trials in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, the
Supreme Court described the charge as having “two distinct conduct
elements”—using or carrying a weapon, and committing an underlying
predicate offense.65 Rejecting the “verb test” applied by the court of
appeals as “unduly limit[ing] the inquiry into the nature of the offense,”
the Court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the statute’s
reference to a predicate crime is “embedded in a prepositional phrase and
not expressed in verbs.”66 Likewise, in Dean v. United States, the Court
observed that a defendant who commits a § 924(c) violation is “guilty of
unlawful conduct twice over.”67
Accordingly, although the language of § 924(c) could plausibly be
interpreted as containing a conduct element (“uses or carries a firearm”)
and a circumstance element (“during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime”),68 the Court has declined to give the
statute that reading. In fact, Rodriguez-Moreno expressly distinguished
§ 924(c) from the federal money laundering statute on the ground that the
latter contains a circumstance element (“[t]he existence of criminally
63. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1245, 1248.
64. Id. at 1247 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280
(1999)).
65. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 (holding that venue lies in a jurisdiction
where either act occurred).
66. Id.
67. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 576 (2009); see also Castillo v. United
States, 530 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) (pointing out that the predicate violent or drug offense is
“not the basic crime here at issue” given that using or carrying a firearm is “itself a separate
substantive crime”).
68. For the argument that the statute can be read as including a circumstance
element, see infra notes 149–72 and accompanying text.
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generated proceeds”) and therefore is not defined simply in terms of
“proscribed conduct.”69
In addition to being faithful to precedent, the Rosemond Court’s
construction of § 924(c) is consistent with the statute’s language and
purpose. Given that even simple possession qualifies as an actus reus
under criminal law,70 the more active behaviors also covered by § 924(c)
—using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm—ought to likewise
be deemed part of the prohibited conduct. And if the “verb test” is not
controlling, then the simultaneous commission of a predicate violent or
drug offense is also a conduct element of the crime. Unlike the money
laundering statute distinguished in Rodriguez-Moreno, which the Court
found to be directed at something other than “the anterior criminal
conduct that yielded the funds allegedly laundered,” § 924(c) is meant to
prohibit both the use of a weapon and the predicate offense.71 In fact, the
underlying impetus for the statute was Congress’s desire to inflict a
heightened penalty on those who pose the special danger to the public
occasioned by both acts.72 Interpreting § 924(c) as consisting of two
independent conduct elements is thus supported by Congress’s intent that
both clauses be treated as “a critical part”73 of a “combination crime.”74
B. Assessing the Mens Rea Implications
If the Court has accurately interpreted § 924(c) as a statute comprising
two prohibited acts, then under the rule set out in Peoni—and endorsed in
Nye & Nissen as well as Rosemond itself75—an accomplice’s purpose
69. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 n.4 (citing precedent holding that venue for
that charge is proper only where the money laundering itself occurred).
70. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 9.03[C], at 96.
71. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 n.4 (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524
U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).
72. See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014) (observing that
§ 924(c) “punishes the temporal and relational conjunction of two separate acts, on the
ground that together they pose an extreme risk of harm”); Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (pointing out that the statute’s “basic purpose” was “to combat the
‘dangerous combination’ of ‘drugs and guns’” (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223, 240 (1993))).
73. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 281 n.4 (referring to § 924(c)’s predicate
offense clause); see Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 126–27 (2000) (describing the
weapons portion of statutes like § 924(c) as “the element lying closest to the heart of the
crime”).
74. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248.
75. See supra notes 24, 44 and accompanying text.
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must extend to each of those conduct elements. Suppose, to borrow a
hypothetical suggested in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rodriguez-Moreno, a
criminal statute prohibits stealing a cookie and eating it.76 A defendant
could be convicted as an accessory to that crime only if she wanted the
cookie both pilfered and consumed. If her purpose extended only to the
act of stealing because she planned to shellac the cookie and display it as
an objet d’art, she would be an accomplice to theft—a “different or lesser
offense”—and not, as the Rosemond majority required, to the “specific
and entire crime charged.”77 So, too, a defendant who purposefully
facilitated a drug deal but did not intend for the principal to carry a gun is
guilty of complicity in a narcotics offense but not the “separate,
freestanding” crime prohibited by § 924(c).78
Given the rationales underlying complicity’s traditional mandate that
accessories must act purposefully with respect to the principal’s crime,
that mens rea should apply to every conduct element of the charge. In a
§ 924(c) prosecution, then, that mental state requirement would attach to
both the commission of the predicate offense and the specific action with
respect to the weapon that triggered the sentencing enhancement—using,
carrying, brandishing, or discharging the firearm, or possessing it in
furtherance of the predicate crime.79 Although the Rosemond opinion is
written in terms of “using or carrying,”80 essentially treating § 924(c) as a
unitary crime, the Court ignored the fact that Rosemond actually received

76. See Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 283–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 310–
11 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (taking the position that a defendant
“must have the purpose to promote or facilitate the particular conduct that forms the basis
for the charge, and thus he will not be liable for conduct that does not fall within this
purpose”).
78. See Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1247–48. For another illustration, see the
discussion of common law burglary infra at notes 206–12 and accompanying text. But cf.
Garvey, supra note 53, at 241–47 (arguing that Rosemond and Peoni can be reconciled if
Judge Hand’s purpose requirement applies only to “non-aggravating elements” of a crime
or only to “incidental facilitators”).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012). But cf. Eric A. Johnson, Does
Criminal Law Matter? Thoughts on Dean v. United States and Flores-Figueroa v. United
States, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123, 147 n.200 (2010) (arguing that the language in § 924(c)
imposing a ten-year sentence “if the firearm is discharged” could be classified as a
conduct, result, or circumstance element); Tyler B. Robinson, Note, A Question of Intent:
Aiding and Abetting Law and the Rule of Accomplice Liability Under § 924(c), 96 MICH.
L. REV. 783, 798–809 (1997) (agreeing that an accomplice’s awareness that the principal
was “carrying” a weapon is inadequate to satisfy complicity’s mens rea burden, but
maintaining that knowledge should suffice in cases where the firearm was “used,” at least
where that use was integral rather than incidental to the predicate crime).
80. See Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243, 1245, 1247, 1249.
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a ten-year sentence for the “distinct and aggravated” charge81 that arises
when a firearm is discharged during a predicate crime.82 Under the
approach outlined in this Article, therefore, the Government should have
been expected to establish that Rosemond’s purpose extended to the firing
of the weapon, even though such intent is not necessary to convict a
principal.83
Requiring proof that an accomplice acted purposefully with respect to
each of a crime’s conduct elements would not, as the Rosemond Court
seemed to fear, create a loophole for the accessory who would not “have
planned the identical crime” “if all had been left” to her.84 The Court’s
hypothetical accomplice who initially had “misgivings” about a crime, or
was “formerly indifferent or even resistant” to it, would nevertheless have
the requisite purpose precisely because she did “eventually accede[]” and
agree to go along with her colleagues.85 And, just as in the robbery of a
post office hypothesized above in Part II,86 a finding that the defendant
acted purposefully would not be foreclosed regardless of what ultimately
motivated her to change her mind or whether she chose to participate
“with a happy heart or a sense of foreboding.”87
In rejecting this approach, the Rosemond majority cited judicial
interpretations of several other federal criminal statutes.88 But those cases
do not obviously support the Court’s requirement of only knowledge
rather than purpose in § 924(c) prosecutions of accomplices. Moreover,
the Court’s discussion of those offenses—liquor tax violations, interstate
transportation of stolen goods, mail fraud, and armed bank robbery—
demonstrates that the confusion surrounding complicity and mens rea is
not restricted to § 924(c).

81. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013) (describing the
portion of § 924(c) that applies when a firearm “is brandished”).
82. See United States v. Rosemond, 695 F.3d 1151, 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 2012),
vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014).
83. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009) (holding that the ten-year
enhancement applies even if the weapon is accidentally discharged). Interestingly, Dean
is not cited by the Court in Rosemond.
84. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1250.
85. Id. (describing an accomplice who preferred to rob a convenience store but
eventually went along with a bank robbery).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
87. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1250; cf. id. at 1255 (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (accusing the majority of “confus[ing] . . . intent and motive”).
88. See id. at 1248–49 (majority opinion).
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Initially, the Rosemond Court’s reliance on the discussion of the federal
liquor tax laws in Bozza v. United States is misplaced.89 The charge at
issue there was operating a distilling business “with intent wilfully to
defraud the United States” of the federal liquor taxes.90 In finding
sufficient evidence that the defendant had the mens rea necessary for
accomplice liability, the Supreme Court observed that he “acted with
knowledge that the distillery business was carried on with an intent to
defraud the Government of its taxes.”91 Given the secrecy with which the
still was operated, the Court found it reasonable for a jury to infer that “a
person who actively helps to operate a secret distillery knows that he is
helping to violate Government revenue laws.”92 Although there is also
language connoting purpose in the opinion—the Court noted that the jury
could “draw[] inferences as to fraudulent purposes from these circumstances”
and commented that violating the federal liquor tax laws is “a well known
object of an illicit distillery”—the Court’s opinion seemed to suggest that
Bozza could be convicted without finding he entertained that purpose so
long as he was aware the principal had that intent.93 The dissenters therefore
had a point when they criticized the majority for failing to require proof
that Bozza “promoted the fraud, or . . . furthered the unlawful scheme, or
in fact had some interest in the project.”94
But whatever the merits of the Court’s ruling in Bozza, the inquiry there
did not involve the conduct element of the crime. Rather, intent to defraud
is another mens rea requirement, making Bozza’s offense a specific intent
crime.95 Certainly, it seems odd to interpret “intent to defraud” to require
a mens rea lower than purpose for either the principal or the accomplice.
Accessories cannot be convicted under similarly worded criminal
statutes—drug offenses that require possession with intent to distribute or
larceny charges that require intent to permanently deprive owners of their
property—if they did not share the principal’s specific intent and instead
planned to use the drugs themselves or borrow the property and then
return it.96 Although Bozza therefore seems misguided, it does not speak

89. See id. at 1249 (citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165 (1947)).
90. Bozza, 330 U.S. at 162 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 2833(a) (1946)).
91. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
93. Id. (emphases added).
94. Id. at 167–68 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Weiss, supra note 1, at 1372
(observing that the Bozza Court “did not seem to be the least bit concerned” that the crime
was a specific intent offense and “[i]n effect . . . held the aider and abettor guilty on a less
culpable mental state than that required of the principal”).
95. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 10.06, at 138–39.
96. See id. § 30.05[B][1], at 471–72; 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(c), at 346 &
n.74.
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to the mens rea burden the prosecution must shoulder in complicity cases
like Rosemond that involve the conduct element of a crime.
Whether the decision in Rosemond can find support in Pereira v. United
States97 is a closer question. The defendants in Pereira, there were
charged with mail fraud and the interstate transportation of stolen goods.98
The Supreme Court interpreted these two federal statutes as requiring at
most a mens rea of knowledge with respect to the use of the mail and the
interstate movement of the stolen property.99 In a mail fraud prosecution,
for example, the Court thought it was enough that the principal “does an
act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary
course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even
though not actually intended.”100 The Court’s discussion of the codefendant’s
accomplice liability was brief, but in finding the evidence sufficient to
sustain his conviction, the Court did not suggest that any greater mens rea
was required of the accessory.101 And in upholding both defendants’
convictions of conspiring to violate the two statutes, the Court observed
that the jury could infer that the accomplice “shared [the principal’s]
knowledge and agreed with him as to the use of the only appropriate means
of collecting the money.”102
The three dissenters discussed accomplice liability at greater length,
concluding that the Government had not established the codefendant’s
complicity in the substantive offenses. Although these Justices cited both
Peoni and Nye & Nissen, they did not suggest that an accessory must act
purposefully with respect to the use of the mails or the crossing of state
lines.103 Rather, they borrowed the mens rea requirement applicable to
principals, maintaining that accomplices can be convicted if they had
“reason to foresee the use of the mails or interstate commerce.”104 The
dissenters thought that standard had not been met, however, finding no
evidence that the codefendant in Pereira “actually knew or had reason to
97. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 8–9; see also id. at 9 (noting with respect to the stolen property charge
that “[it] is common knowledge that [out-of-state] checks must be sent to the drawee bank
for collection, and it follows that [the principal] intended the . . . bank to send this check
across state lines”).
101. See id. at 10–11.
102. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
103. See id. at 14 (Minton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 15.
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believe that a check . . . would be drawn on an out-of-town bank,
necessitating its being placed in the mails for collection.”105
The federal stolen goods statute at issue in Pereira prohibits
“transport[ing] . . . in interstate . . . commerce” certain goods, “knowing
the same to have been stolen . . . or taken by fraud.”106 Although the
interstate nature of the transportation could be viewed as part of the
crime’s actus reus, it is often considered a circumstance element.107
Moreover, the crossing of state lines is the factor that gives the federal
courts jurisdiction over certain thefts, and jurisdictional elements generally
carry little or no mental state requirement.108 If the component of this
offense that sanctions a mens rea lower than purpose is a circumstance
element rather than part of the prohibited conduct, it has less weight in
evaluating the mens rea prerequisites for a criminal statute like § 924(c),
which the Court interpreted as composed exclusively of conduct elements.
Classifying the elements of Pereira’s mail fraud charge is more
complicated. The federal mail fraud statute makes it a crime for one who,
“having devised or intending to devise any scheme . . . to defraud,” mails
a letter or “knowingly causes [a letter] to be delivered by mail” “for the
purpose of executing” the fraudulent scheme.109 The structure of the
statutory language suggests that using the mail is the actus reus of the
crime.110 This reading is confirmed by Supreme Court precedent

105. Id.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).
107. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 409 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); Lisa Rachlin, Comment, The Mens Rea Dilemma for Aiding and
Abetting a Felon in Possession, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1287, 1291 n.24 (2009); see also Paul
Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1327, 1349 n.91 (2008) (describing the federal child pornography statute in similar terms).
108. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975) (observing that “the
existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the
actor”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 cmt. at 211 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (explaining that mens rea is typically “irrelevant” with respect to a jurisdictional
element because it has “no bearing on the actor’s fault”); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11,
§ 5.1(b), at 336 n.13. For competing definitions of jurisdictional elements, see infra note
191.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
110. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions
of Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
23, 42 (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2010/03/OSullivan
Honest-Services-Fraud-63-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-23-20101.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5TP
W9PV] (giving the statute this interpretation); cf. C.J. Williams, What Is the Gist of the
Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287, 307–14 (2014) (noting that courts have
construed other federal laws that are modeled after the mail fraud statute but contain
somewhat different sentence structures as focused on fraudulent schemes rather than use
of mail or interstate commerce).
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characterizing use of the mail as the “gist” of the statute111 and providing
that every individual letter can give rise to a separate mail fraud charge.112
Admittedly, if use of the mail in fact constitutes the crime’s conduct
element, then Pereira provides support for Rosemond’s decision to attach
a mens rea less culpable than purpose to § 924(c)’s actus reus
requirement.
On the other hand, despite its wording, the focus of the mail fraud
statute today is on punishing fraudulent schemes that happen to involve
the mail. Although the original version of the statute, enacted in 1872,
required proof of intent to use the mail,113 Congress eliminated that
language long ago,114 and as noted above, Pereira required only that the
involvement of the mail was something the defendant was aware of or
reasonably could have foreseen.115 The Court has also ruled that
defendants can be convicted of this offense even though the mail was not
“an essential element of the scheme.”116 Rather, mail fraud is an appropriate
charge so long as the mail was “incident to an essential part of the scheme”
or “a step in [the] plot,”117 and even through the letters in question were
“routine and innocent” and did not themselves contain any
misrepresentation.118 Moreover, the mail—like interstate movement—
is the factor that creates federal jurisdiction over certain frauds,119 and the
Pereira Court did not draw any distinction between the two statutes at
issue in the case and their corresponding jurisdictional elements.120 Given
111. United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155, 159 (1914).
112. See Ex parte Henry, 123 U.S. 372, 374 (1887); see also Williams, supra note
110, at 293 & n.44 (reporting that every federal court of appeals has endorsed this
practice).
113. See Young, 232 U.S. at 160–62; Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188–89
(1895).
114. See Williams, supra note 110, at 295–96 (describing 1909 amendment that
replaced language requiring that the defendant “open[ed] or intend[ed] to open
correspondence” with language allowing conviction on proof that the defendant “caused”
the mails to be used (quoting Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, ch. 321, § 215, 35
Stat. 1088, 1130)).
115. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954).
116. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710 (1989).
117. Id. at 711 (quoting Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916)).
118. Id.
119. See Weiss, supra note 1, at 1464 (calling mail fraud “unusual” because the
jurisdictional element is not a matter of strict liability).
120. But cf. id. (distinguishing mail fraud from the interstate transportation of stolen
property on the grounds that the mail fraud statute is designed “to prevent the use of the
mails to facilitate schemes to defraud” whereas the stolen goods statute “is aimed at the
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the ways the mail fraud provision has been amended and interpreted over
the years, it now “bears only a vague resemblance to its ancestor”; it has
instead become a “general federal fraud statute” and “abuse of the United
States mails no longer forms the core of the crime.”121 As a result, it is
unsurprising that some commentators refer to the use of the mail as a
circumstance element of mail fraud, making it less relevant in assessing
the mens rea prescribed for a pure conduct crime.122
A final potential interpretation of the mail fraud statute is that it, like
the Rosemond Court’s version of § 924(c), consists of two conduct
elements: mailing and defrauding. But that seems the least credible
reading given that mail fraud is an inchoate crime and requires only an
intent to come up with a fraudulent scheme rather than an already fully
actualized plan.123
By contrast, armed bank robbery—the final crime cited by the Rosemond
majority—more plausibly consists of two conduct elements. Federal law
defines bank robbery as taking or attempting to take “by force and
violence, or by intimidation,” property belonging to certain financial
institutions.124 Defendants commit the aggravated offense of armed bank
robbery when they “assault[] any person, or put[] in jeopardy the life of
any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device,” while committing
the crime of bank robbery.125 As the Rosemond Court noted, some circuit
courts have upheld accomplice liability for armed bank robbery on a
finding that the accessory knew one of the robbers “would use weapons
in carrying out the crime.”126 Note, however, that there is no Supreme
Court precedent on this point and other federal courts disagree, requiring
proof of purpose for an accomplice even though a principal’s conviction
can rest on mere knowledge.127 More important, some courts and
commentators view armed robbery as a crime consisting of a conduct
element (robbery) and a circumstance element (while armed).128

evils of theft [and] fraud,” rather than “the regulation of interstate transportation” and
therefore its jurisdictional element is merely “a means to an end” (quoting United States
v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985))).
121. Williams, supra note 110, at 288–89.
122. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 409 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 12.2(c)(4), at 282–83 & n.150.
123. See Peter T. Barbur, Note, Mail Fraud and Free Speech, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
942, 945 (1986) (pointing out that mail fraud’s “first element does not focus on conduct,
but rather on a scheme or state of mind”).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2012).
126. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1249 (2014).
127. See Weiss, supra note 1, at 1381–82.
128. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(b), at 344 n.64 (citing state and federal
cases).
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Thus, if the Rosemond majority correctly classified § 924(c) as a crime
that simply prohibits certain conduct, the only controlling precedent that
lends support to the Court’s holding is Pereira, and it does so only on the
assumption that the mail and interstate movement are considered part of
the actus reus of the mail fraud and stolen goods statutes. If, on the other
hand, § 924(c) requires proof of both conduct and an attendant circumstance,
attaching a mens rea less culpable than purpose to its circumstance
element may be more justifiable. Before exploring this alternative reading
of the statute, the subpart that follows considers whether Rosemond’s
holding can be defended on the ground that knowledge may lead to an
inference of purpose.
C. Inferring Purpose from Knowledge
Admittedly, a defendant’s awareness can be used to infer purpose, and
the ruling in Rosemond would have been unexceptionable had it been
limited to that rationale.129 But purpose requires more than mere knowledge,
and more than even the advance knowledge called for by Rosemond. As the
Supreme Court has previously acknowledged, knowledge and purpose are
distinct mental states, and the two therefore cannot automatically be
equated.130
In Direct Sales Co. v. United States, for example, the Court discussed
the analogous mens rea questions that arise in conspiracy cases in
determining whether a coconspirator had the necessary purpose to promote
the target offense.131 There, narcotics conspiracy charges were filed against
a pharmaceutical manufacturer that conducted a mail-order business and
sold controlled substances to a doctor who then illegally distributed them.
129. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 316 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (observing that “often, if not usually, aid rendered with guilty knowledge
implies purpose since it has no other motivation”).
130. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (calling the distinction
between purpose and knowledge “esoteric,” but equating purpose with “‘conscious[]
desire[], . . . whatever the likelihood of that result’” and knowledge with awareness of a
“‘practical[] certain[ty], . . . whatever [the defendant’s] desire may be as to that result’”
(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978))); see also Simons,
supra note 30, at 476 (commenting that “[m]ental states of belief and mental states of
desire are fundamentally different”).
131. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943) (referring to
“becom[ing] a party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it”); see also United States v.
Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 207 (1940) (noting that a coconspirator is “in substance the same
thing” as an accomplice).
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The Court noted that the conspiracy offense at issue required proof that
the company not only was aware the doctor was illegally distributing the
drugs but also had the requisite “intent,”—that is, that “by the sale [the
corporation] intend[ed] to further, promote and cooperate in” the target
crime.132 Thus, “knowledge,” “acquiescence,” or “indifference” as to how
its product was being used was insufficient; rather, intent required proof
of “informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation.”133 On
the facts before it, the Court found that standard satisfied: the drug
manufacturer not only was cognizant of how its products were being used,
but also had the necessary intent because the doctor was purchasing such
an unusually large quantity of drugs that it was making “profits which
it knew could come only from its encouragement of [the doctor’s] illicit
operations.”134 Therefore, the Court concluded, “[t]he step from knowledge
to intent and agreement” could be made in Direct Sales.135
The Court, however, distinguished its previous decision in United
States v. Falcone, which found insufficient evidence to sustain conspiracy
charges brought against distributors who sold sugar, yeast, and, cans,
knowing that some of their customers were using the products to illegally
manufacture liquor.136 That case was different, the Direct Sales Court
reasoned, because the items sold there were “articles of free commerce”
that were not “incapable of further legal use except by compliance with
rigid regulations.”137 Thus, the defendants’ knowledge in Falcone could
not support an inference of purpose.
In line with these precedents, the prosecution in a § 924(c) trial could
ask the jury to infer that an accomplice who was aware her confederate
was carrying a gun must also have intended for the gun to be on the
scene—just as the Rosemond majority observed that a jury may
“permissibly infer” the accomplice had the requisite advance knowledge
from her “failure to object or withdraw” once the gun was “displayed or
used by a confederate.”138 In some cases, however, the inference of
132. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711.
133. Id. at 713; see also United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)
(finding insufficient evidence of mens rea where “it was of no moment” to the accomplice
whether or not the principal committed the crime).
134. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713; see also id. at 706–07 (noting that the doctor
eventually purchased enough drugs to dispense in one day what the average physician
dispensed in a year and that the corporation’s quantity-sales discounts “attracted . . . a
disproportionately large group” of customers who were doctors convicted on narcotics
charges).
135. Id. at 713; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 404 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985) (allowing an inference of purpose in similar circumstances).
136. See Falcone, 311 U.S. at 209–11.
137. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 710.
138. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1250 n.9 (2014).
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purpose is not a reasonable one. For example, weapons are not involved
in most sales of small quantities of marijuana. As the Rosemond majority
observed, “no one contends that a § 924(c) violation is a natural and
probable consequence of simple drug trafficking.”139
By way of illustration, suppose a small-time marijuana dealer routinely
partners with a colleague who habitually carries a weapon. The dealer has
advance knowledge of the gun but may have no reason to foresee that it
will play any role in their business. If the confederate unexpectedly draws
or displays the weapon one day, it is difficult to argue the dealer intends
for the weapon to be used. In fact, her purpose may be precisely the
opposite. In a case with Rosemond’s facts, for instance, the dealer might
try to talk her colleague out of drawing or firing the weapon when their
would-be buyers attempt to steal the narcotics, taking the position that the
small quantity of drugs at stake is not worth risking injury, attracting the
attention of the police, or facing prosecution on more serious charges.140
This defendant’s culpability vis-à-vis the weapon is not very different
from the accomplice the Rosemond Court would have exempted from
liability, who learns about a gun “at the scene” at a point when it is too
late for her to do anything with that information.141
Although knowledge can therefore lead to an inference of purpose in
some cases, that is clearly not what the Rosemond Court had in mind. In
settling for proof of “active participation in a drug sale” combined with
“prior knowledge of the gun’s involvement,” the majority not only expressly
declined to require proof that a § 924(c) accomplice “affirmatively desire[]”
the use of a weapon but also went further.142 The majority additionally
rejected the defendant’s position that juries may infer purpose from
knowledge but must also be allowed to “draw the opposite conclusion”—to
find that on some facts a defendant with advance knowledge of a weapon

139. Id. at 1248 n.7; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.39, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research 
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table39.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KF2
XWHF] (reporting that weapons were involved in ten percent of federal marijuana cases
in 2013).
140. But cf. Synopsis for We’re the Millers (2013), IMDB, http://www.imdb.
com/title/tt1723121/synopsis?ref_=tt_stry_pl [https://perma.cc/2PDT-S8AV?type=image]
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (describing movie in which a marijuana dealer is robbed of his
supply of marijuana and then forced by his distributor to import a load of marijuana from
Mexico in order to repay the debt).
141. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249.
142. Id. at 1250–51.
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lacks the necessary purpose for accomplice liability.143 That defendant
may have had knowledge and may have substantially assisted the predicate
offense. (Note that, according to the Court’s actus reus ruling, the defendant
need not have facilitated the weapon at all.144) Although basing accomplice
liability on a standard resembling Rosemond’s—knowledge and substantial
assistance—has some academic support,145 it does not constitute purpose.
As a result, it cannot satisfy the mens rea requirement that is prescribed
by Peoni and a majority of state legislatures and that the Rosemond Court
purported to apply.
Thus, the Court’s holding that Rosemond could be convicted as an
accomplice without proof that his purpose extended to the firearm does
not find solid support either in precedent or in the maxim that purpose can
be inferred from knowledge. Rosemond’s insistence on requiring knowledge
rather than purpose may be more defensible, however, if § 924(c) is viewed
as a crime that includes a circumstance as well as a conduct element. That
alternative interpretation of the statute is addressed in the following Part.
V. CONDUCT PLUS CIRCUMSTANCE CRIMES
Notwithstanding the clear tenor of the opinion in Rosemond, treating
§ 924(c) as a pure conduct crime is not the only plausible construction of
the statute. As discussed below, the statute cannot be read to require proof
of a result, but it can arguably be interpreted as including a circumstance
element. Assuming the statute is classified in that way, the requisite mens
rea for the circumstance element ought to depend on where criminal law

143. Id. at 1250.
144. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 314–15 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (describing an earlier draft that would have made knowledge plus
substantial facilitation a sufficient basis for accomplice liability); see also Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 n.17 (1961) (quoting this provision with approval); cf.
Alexander, supra note 29, at 944–47 (advocating that the law of complicity reduce the
requisite mens rea to recklessness in cases of substantial assistance); Dressler, supra note
7, at 446–48 (endorsing accomplice liability based on substantial participation for
accessories who caused the crime to occur); Kadish, supra note 6, at 378–79, 388
(proposing that recklessness and substantial assistance suffice for felonies that require only
a mens rea of recklessness). Some jurisdictions have instead enacted criminal facilitation
statutes making it a separate offense to knowingly and substantially facilitate a crime.
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 318–19 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (calling such an approach “a sensible accommodation of the competing
considerations”), and Duff, supra note 27, at 168 (endorsing these statutes), with 2
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(d), at 350 (hypothesizing that the Model Penal Code’s
earlier draft was rejected because of vagueness concerns), and Weisberg, supra note 5, at
270 (concluding that such statutes are an “inadequate solution,” in part because of “ill
coordination with complicity laws”).

156

KINPORTS FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 133, 2015]

10/30/2018 9:14 AM

The Elements of Complicity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

draws the line between conduct and attendant circumstances. If the
concept of actus reus is a narrow one, restricted to the defendant’s willed
movements, then the circumstance elements constitute the essence of the
offense and complicity’s purpose requirement should be extended to
them. Alternatively, if conduct is more broadly defined, the same mens
rea rule for attendant circumstances should govern both principals and
accomplices.
A. Interpreting § 924(c)
Identifying the result elements of a criminal offense is comparatively
straightforward; results are “physical circumstances that the actor changes
or has the power to change.”146 Although criminal statutes typically do
not require evidence that the defendant’s act precipitated a particular result,
there are some exceptions.147 Most notably, the defendant must have been
the cause of the victim’s death in order to support a homicide conviction.148
Like most offenses, however, § 924(c) does not contain a result
element. The crime is completed once the defendant uses or carries a
firearm during and in relation to a predicate offense. Neither the weapon nor
the underlying crime needs to have led to any further consequence.
Defining and identifying a crime’s circumstance elements is a more
formidable task. The Model Penal Code contains no formal definition of
attendant circumstances,149 although the comments accompanying the
provision on the crime of attempt mention that circumstances “refer to the
objective situation that the law requires to exist, in addition to the

146. Simons, supra note 30, at 535; see also R.A. Duff, The Circumstances of an
Attempt, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 100, 104 (1991) (defining results as “events which occur only
because the action is done—which are caused by the action”); Robinson & Grall, supra
note 1, at 724 (suggesting as the definition “circumstance[s] changed by the actor”). But
cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 304 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(making the somewhat surprising assertion that “criminally obtaining property” is a crime
with a result element); Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 723 (arguing it can be “difficult”
to distinguish result elements from circumstance elements).
147. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 14.01[A], at 182. But cf. Moore, supra note
15, at 397 (arguing that offenses typically viewed as pure conduct crimes do have “causal
requirements”).
148. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 14.01[A], at 182.
149. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(defining only the “conduct” element); see also Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 706
(calling the Model Penal Code’s “failure to define adequately” and “distinguish” the
elements of an offense a “major defect”).
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defendant’s act or any results that the act may cause.”150 Criminal law
scholars have proposed that circumstance elements encompass everything
other than the pure conduct element of a crime—that attendant circumstances
include “all other physical conditions, apart from the actor’s own conduct.”151
Commonly accepted illustrations of circumstance elements are the age of
the victim in a statutory rape prosecution, the victim’s official status in a
case involving assault of a federal official, and common law burglary’s
requirement that the illicit entry occur at night.152
Nevertheless, separating crimes that simply bar certain conduct from
those that also require proof of an attendant circumstance has proven to
be notoriously difficult.153 Often, the language of a criminal statute can
be interpreted as containing an act and circumstance element or alternatively
“only a single elaborate conduct requirement.”154 For example, is the
victim’s lack of consent in a rape prosecution an attendant circumstance
or part of the prohibited conduct? The answer to that question turns on
whether the actus reus for rape is simply “sexual intercourse” or instead
“non-consensual sexual intercourse”; the difference thus “depends on, and
varies with, the various descriptions we might offer of an action.”155 Even
if a jurisdiction has adopted the Model Penal Code’s suggestion and
defined rape in terms of “compel[ling]” the victim “to submit by force or
by threat,”156 the verb compel can be viewed as a pure conduct element or
as “combin[ing] both conduct and circumstance elements.”157

150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 301 n.9 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
151. Simons, supra note 30, at 535; see also Duff, supra note 146, at 104 (observing
that circumstances “exist independently of the action, and provide the context in which it
is done”); Arnold N. Enker, Mens Rea and Criminal Attempt, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
845, 868 (equating circumstances with “present” facts and results with “future” facts);
Johnson, supra note 79, at 148 (observing that a circumstance element is a “condition or
event” the prosecution “need not prove that the defendant caused”); Robinson & Grall,
supra note 1, at 719–20 (distinguishing a defendant’s conduct, or “actual physical movement,”
from the circumstances or “characteristics of conduct,” that is, the “nature of conduct”);
cf. Smith, supra note 30, at 424–25 (drawing a distinction between “pure circumstances,”
which are elements of the crime though “not essential to the occurrence of the
consequences,” and “consequential circumstances,” which are “essential to the occurrence
of the consequences” but “not necessarily required by the definition of the crime”).
152. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 301–03 & n.9 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 11.3(c), at 217–18 & nn.43–45;
Enker, supra note 151, at 876–77.
153. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 240 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); Enker, supra note 151, at 869.
154. Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 708.
155. Duff, supra note 146, at 104–05.
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
157. Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 709.
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The concept of conduct could be defined quite narrowly, by whittling
down the definition of the offense until only the bare-bones description of
the defendant’s willed movements remains.158 This constricted view of
the actus reus would make it “a relatively unspecific and unimportant aspect
of an offense”; instead, the crime’s circumstance and, where applicable,
result elements would become its “most significant” components.159
In any sex offense prosecution, for example, the defendant’s sexual act
would be the prohibited conduct and everything else—any of the victim’s
characteristics,160 the failure to consent161—would be considered an attendant
circumstance. Similarly, the actus reus for every possession offense would
simply be the act of obtaining some tangible property, and everything
about that item—what it was (for example, as a controlled substance,162 a
weapon,163 or obscene material164); who owned it;165 whether it was lost

158. See Duff, supra note 146, at 108 (suggesting that conduct consist of “the
narrowest action-description which still specifies part of th[e] actus reus,” with
circumstances including “all other aspects of the actus reus”); Smith, supra note 30, at 424
(proposing that the actus reus be identified by “eliminating the various circumstances
required by the definition of the crime until only the basic event remains”); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 301 n.9 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(providing examples that implicitly endorse a similar approach).
159. Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 720–21.
160. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 301 n.9 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); Duff, supra note 146, at 108–11; Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at
742 n.269.
161. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 231–32 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 30.05[B][4], at 474; 2 LAFAVE, supra note
11, § 11.3, at 36–37 (Supp. 2013); Duff, supra note 146, at 100. But cf. Kenneth W.
Simons, The Conceptual Structure of Consent in Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
577, 615 n.47 (2006) (implying that nonconsent is part of the actus reus).
162. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 10.04[B], at 128. But see MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03 cmt. at 407 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (suggesting that “the sale
of narcotics” is a pure conduct crime); Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the
Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673,
733 (2009) (likewise including “controlled substance” with the actus reus).
163. See Garvey, supra note 53, at 240; Johnson, supra note 79, at 151. But see
Jeffrey P. Kaplan & Georgia M. Green, Grammar and Inferences of Rationality in
Interpreting the Child Pornography Statute, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1223, 1250 (1995)
(classifying a machine gun’s ability to fire automatically as part of the actus reus).
164. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.2(a), at 342 & n.7; Ohm, supra note 107, at
1349 n.91.
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 250 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); Duff, supra note 146, at 100, 111; Smith, supra note 30, at 424.
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or stolen;166 and where the possession occurred (near a school,167 for
example)—would qualify as a circumstance element.
There is nothing inherently objectionable about this approach, although
it does run counter to our commonsense inclination that circumstance
elements do not constitute the crux of a criminal offense.168 Perhaps for
that reason, this narrow definition of conduct elements is not followed
religiously; in fact, a tremendous amount of variation can be found in how
the actus reus of criminal offenses is described.169
As discussed above in Part IV.A, Rosemond explicitly classified
§ 924(c) as a pure conduct crime, an interpretation that accords with both
the statute’s language and legislative purpose, as well as with precedent
endorsing that treatment of the charge and denying that it includes a
circumstance element. Nevertheless, at one point the term circumstances
appears in the Rosemond opinion in a context that could refer to attendant
circumstance elements of crimes. Specifically, in introducing the paragraph
described in Part IV.B that cited judicial interpretations of other federal
statutes, the majority observed, “[w]e have previously found th[e] intent
requirement [for accomplice liability] satisfied when a person actively
participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances
constituting the charged offense.”170 The Court did not make any further
reference to circumstance elements, instead treating § 924(c) as limited to
twin conduct requirements. As noted above, however, several of the
criminal statutes relied on in this portion of the Rosemond opinion arguably
consist of a conduct and a circumstance element.171
If the Court in fact intended this sentence to suggest that § 924(c)
includes a circumstance element, the most natural reading of the statutory
language supports the conclusion that “uses or carries a firearm” is the
conduct element and “during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime” is the circumstance element. Just like “at night”
in the common law’s definition of burglary, the attendant circumstance
describes when the forbidden conduct must occur. Under that interpretation,
however, the Court was wrong to absolve the prosecution from the

166. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. at 224 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985); Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 742 n.269; Smith, supra note 30, at 428.
167. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(b), at 345 n.64.
168. See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280 n.4 (1999)
(implicitly distinguishing circumstance elements from the “critical part” of a crime).
169. For illustrations of more expansive definitions of conduct, see, for example, 2
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(f), at 355 & n.130 (characterizing the “filing of a false
financial statement” and “charging an unlawful price” for a house as the actus reus of those
crimes); see also supra notes 158–167 and accompanying text.
170. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248–49 (2014) (emphasis added).
171. See supra notes 97–128 and accompanying text.
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obligation of proving that Rosemond’s purpose extended to the weapon
(the conduct element).
On the other hand, in an effort to justify Rosemond’s holding, § 924(c)
could be said to prohibit the commission of a violent or drug trafficking
crime (the conduct element) under the circumstances where a firearm is
used or carried. That interpretation, though counter to the structure of the
statutory language, corresponds with the way armed robbery laws are
sometimes viewed.172 As discussed in the subpart that follows, this
reading of the statute could potentially support convicting an accomplice
whose mens rea vis-à-vis the weapon did not rise to the level of purpose.
B. Assessing the Mens Rea Implications
If, contrary to Rosemond’s interpretation of § 924(c), the statute
consists of both a conduct and a circumstance element, the mental state
required of an accomplice vis-à-vis the crime’s attendant circumstance is
a matter of some controversy. Very little attention has been paid in the
courts and legislatures to the question of complicity’s mens rea for
circumstance elements, and the judges who have addressed it have reached
conflicting conclusions.173 Even the drafters of the Model Penal Code
declined to take a position, opting instead for “deliberate ambiguity” that
“left [the issue] to resolution by the courts.”174
If criminal law accepts the distinction between conduct and circumstance
elements endorsed by some scholars and defines the actus reus of a crime
very narrowly,175 the purpose traditionally required for complicity liability
ought to be extended to the attendant circumstances as well. Stripping the
conduct element down to a bare-bones description of the defendant’s
willed movements means that the prohibited conduct becomes a generic,
colorless action—possessing or selling something, engaging in sex—and
the circumstance elements do all the work. Excusing the prosecution from
the burden of establishing the accessory’s purpose with respect to the
gravamen of the crime undermines the justifications for imposing a high

172. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. But see Garvey, supra note 53, at
243 (arguing that this reading of § 924(c) “just doesn’t fit”).
173. See Alexander & Kessler, supra note 9, at 1160–61; Robinson & Grall, supra
note 1, at 741 n.268.
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 311 n.37 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
175. See supra notes 158–67 and accompanying text.
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mens rea for complicity in the first place and thereby threatens to unduly
expand accomplice liability to those who did not intentionally associate
themselves with the offense.
Attaching a mens rea of purpose to attendant circumstances may well
mean that accomplices must entertain a more culpable mens rea than the
principal with respect to those elements.176 But that same discrepancy
occurs with a crime’s conduct elements, given that most criminal statutes
do not call for proof that the defendant acted purposefully.177 If the
circumstance elements constitute the essence of the crime, the rationale
for requiring proof of purpose with respect to the actus reus applies
equally to the attendant circumstances. As explained above, complicity
laws deliberately set a high bar for accomplice liability when it comes to
mens rea, both to compensate for the minimal actus reus requirement and
to ensure that minor participants are sufficiently culpable to be held
criminally responsible for offenses committed by others.178
Despite imposing a greater mens rea burden when charges are brought
against an accessory instead of the principal, requiring proof of purpose
vis-à-vis attendant circumstances does not signify that the accomplice
must necessarily have intended for those circumstances to exist. The
Model Penal Code defines purpose as applied to a circumstance element
to mean that the defendant either was “aware of the existence” of the
circumstance or “believe[d] or hope[d]” that it existed.179 Unfortunately,
the relationship between purpose and knowledge in this context is not
entirely clear. The Code defines knowledge in reference to circumstances
as simple awareness180 and does not further clarify the terms believe and
hope. Although at one point the drafters equate purpose and knowledge
with respect to circumstance elements,181 the comments accompanying

176. See Grace E. Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 2169, 2179–80 (1988) (raising this objection).
177. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 234 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 10.04[A][1], at 121.
178. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(ii) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985). But cf. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.2(b), at 344 n.17 (observing that this provision
has not been widely adopted).
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(i) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (providing that a defendant acts knowingly with respect to attendant circumstances
if she is “aware . . . that such circumstances exist”).
181. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.9 cmt. at 415 n.14 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (noting that “purpose with respect to an attendant circumstance of the
actor’s conduct means knowledge”).
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the Code’s mens rea provision indicate that purpose, as the more culpable
state of mind, encompasses knowledge.182
As a theoretical matter, however, one can erroneously, and even
unreasonably, believe in the existence of some circumstance or can
entertain a far-fetched hope that it exists and therefore seemingly satisfy
the Model Penal Code’s literal definition of purpose but not knowledge.183
Whatever the intent of the Code’s drafters, an accessory who falls into any
of these categories is sufficiently blameworthy to support accomplice
liability. As other scholars have recognized, individuals act intentionally
with respect to circumstances if they either know that the circumstances
exist or “hope[] that they exist,” even if the “‘odds’” are “‘very great’” that
they do not.184 Defendants who intentionally aid a principal, knowing that
an attendant circumstance exists or hoping or believing it does, cannot
complain that they lack the requisite culpability regarding the gravamen
of the crime.
Hoping is arguably distinguishable from believing, however, and some
might have reservations about criminalizing unrealistic hopes on the
grounds that one who hopes a circumstance exists “may be marginally
more culpable” than one who knows it exists yet not “sufficiently dangerous
to merit punishment” “[a]bsent a belief” in its existence.185 Nevertheless,
parties to a crime often vary considerably in the roles they play in the

182. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 233 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (“Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common
element in both conceptions.”).
183. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 10.04[B], at 128 (equating knowledge of an
attendant circumstance with a “correct belief”); cf. Alexander, supra note 29, at 942–43
(defining purpose to require not just “desire” but also a “belie[f] that [one’s] conduct
increases the risk of harm, even if the increase is very slight”); Simons, supra note 30, at
476–77 (associating beliefs with knowledge and desires with purpose, and commenting
that “purpose and intention,” in contrast to “wishes and hopes,” are “desires that the actor
believes she has some power to effectuate”). But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 cmt. at
371 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (noting that whether the mens rea of
purpose is satisfied by hoping a crime will be committed raises “a question of fact”).
184. Smith, supra note 30, at 426–27 (quoting JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
379 (Glanville L. Williams 10th ed. 1947)); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 89 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
Methuen & Co. 1982) (1789) (noting that circumstances are “objects of the understanding
only” and not “objects of the will”); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 5.2(a), at 342 (observing
that “knowledge rather than desire is most significant as to attendant circumstances”);
Cook, supra note 30, at 657 (equating intent with circumstances “which I know or believe
to exist (quoting JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 337 (4th ed. 1913))).
185. Simons, supra note 30, at 500.
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offense, from the mastermind who sits at home calling the shots186 to the
audience members who encourage an illegal performance by politely
applauding.187 The law of complicity has elected to resolve the competing
interests at stake by adopting a one-size-fits-all model that holds every
party to a crime equally responsible and then takes any differences in their
culpability into account at sentencing.188 Here, too, the accomplice who
contributed to an offense is “sufficiently dangerous” to be criminally
liable when the crime was actually committed and the circumstance she
hoped for, but considered a long shot, turned out to have been true.
Another possible objection to extending complicity’s purpose requirement
to circumstance elements surrounds the difficulty of establishing a
defendant’s state of mind with respect to an attendant circumstance. Our
actions are arguably “more likely to disclose our purposes rather than our
beliefs,” and therefore a defendant’s conduct may not “tell us very much,
or for that matter anything at all, about his state of mind with respect to
the circumstance” elements of a crime.189 This concern may be especially
pronounced with respect to circumstances that contain no “moral”
component.190
Certainly, an exception could be made for a crime’s purely jurisdictional
elements, with the same mens rea requirement attaching to both principals
and accomplices for that category of attendant circumstances. But diluting
the mens rea requirement for material elements that have a substantive
relationship to the definition of the offense risks convicting minor participants
on charges they did not intentionally facilitate.191 Moreover, adopting the
definition of purpose advocated here, which is satisfied by proof of an
accomplice’s awareness of the attendant circumstance, would ease the
prosecution’s evidentiary burden.
186. See, e.g., People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 279–80 (Ct. App. 1976).
187. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jeffery, (1951) 1 All E.R. 464, at 464 (K.B.).
188. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 299 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 30.04[B][2][b], at 468–69; see also GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 8.5.3, at 644–45 (1978) (observing that the
Anglo-American approach differs from the one taken by German and Soviet law); cf.
Moore, supra note 15, at 448–52 (calling for elimination of the principal-accomplice
distinction given the wide variation in accomplices’ culpability).
189. Enker, supra note 151, at 871.
190. See Smith, supra note 30, at 429 (using common law burglary’s nighttime
requirement as an illustration).
191. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (defining a material element as one that is not purely procedural or jurisdictional
but rather is related to “the harm or evil . . . sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense”); cf. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975) (maintaining that a
jurisdictional element is not necessarily “outside the scope of the evil Congress intended
to forestall,” but instead means “merely that the existence of the fact that confers federal
jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time” of the crime).
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Some scholars have advanced an alternative proposal for the mens rea
that ought to govern circumstance elements in complicity cases. Rather
than requiring proof of purpose, they advocate that the same mens rea
needed to convict the principal should extend to any accessories as well.192
This position is defended on the ground that the policy considerations
underlying the mental state requirement chosen for a particular circumstance
element are identical for all parties to the crime.193
The Model Penal Code and some academics have endorsed that
approach for the crime of attempt,194 and in United States v. Feola the
Supreme Court likewise adopted it for conspiracy—at least for circumstance
elements that are jurisdictional in nature.195 If the practice of borrowing
the substantive crime’s mens rea for circumstance elements is followed
for inchoate offenses like attempt and conspiracy, then it is arguably even
more justifiable in complicity cases where a completed crime in fact
occurred under all the required attendant circumstances.196
Nevertheless, imposing the same mental state requirement vis-à-vis
circumstances on both the principal and accomplice makes sense only if
the actus reus of a crime is defined broadly and circumstance elements are
192. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 30.05[B][4], at 474; Kadish, supra note
6, at 385–86; Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 742–43; Mueller, supra note 176, at 2191.
193. See Kadish, supra note 6, at 385–86; Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 742.
194. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) cmt. at 303 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (“allowing the policy of the substantive offense to control with respect
to circumstance elements” because the defendant “has sufficiently established his
dangerousness” and “poses the type of danger to society that the substantive offense is
designed to prevent”); Duff, supra note 146, at 100; Smith, supra note 30, at 434–35; cf.
Enker, supra note 151, at 871, 874–75, 879 (advocating this position for circumstance
elements requiring a mens rea of at least recklessness).
195. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696 (1975) (concluding that
conspiracy to assault a federal officer does not require proof that the defendants were
aware of the victim’s identity). But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 409, 411
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (acknowledging that a conspirator might be
sufficiently culpable in such situations, but ultimately leaving the question unresolved
because “[t]he fact that conspiracy is defined in terms of an agreement produces
difficulties” in cases where the attendant circumstance “neither existed nor was in the
contemplation of the parties”).
196. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 404 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (commenting that mens rea “considerations are the same” for conspiracy
and complicity); Enker, supra note 151, at 869–70 (making a similar argument in
advocating that a mens rea of purpose should not govern circumstance elements in attempt
prosecutions). But cf. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(d), at 348 n.90 (suggesting that a
lower mens rea might be appropriate for conspiracy, especially where it carries a lesser
sentence).
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construed narrowly.197 Under that model, accomplice liability remains
properly restricted to those who acted purposefully with respect to the
gravamen of the crime. If, however, criminal law views the distinction
between conduct and circumstance elements differently, with a contracted
conception of the actus reus, applying the same mens rea vis-à-vis
circumstance elements risks expanding complicity liability to those whose
purpose extended only to a blameless action committed by the principal
(possessing, selling, engaging in sex) and whose culpability with respect to
the essence of the charge was merely knowledge, recklessness, or even
lower.198
The Model Penal Code’s recommendation that the same state of mind
rules should govern both principals and accomplices for the result elements
of crimes does not call for a contrary conclusion.199 In an involuntary
manslaughter prosecution, for example, the Model Penal Code would
convict an accessory on a showing that she had the same criminally
negligent mens rea vis-à-vis the victim’s death required to convict the
principal.200 Result elements, which are generally restricted to homicide
charges,201 are distinguishable from circumstance elements, however,
because an accessory who had the requisite purpose regarding the actus
reus (the conduct that proved fatal) has demonstrated sufficient culpability
to be guilty of homicide. That accomplice therefore cannot object that her
intent did not extend to the gravamen of the crime.
A final alternative is the one adopted by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code, who declined to recommend a “rigid formula” governing the mens
rea required vis-à-vis circumstance elements in all complicity cases and
instead delegated the question to the courts.202 While this position has the
197. Cf. Alexander & Kessler, supra note 9, at 1166 (warning that the same mens
rea requirement for circumstance elements should not apply to both principals and
accomplices where the accessory’s assistance was not in “close temporal and spatial
proximity” to the crime).
198. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. at 301–02 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (describing strict liability circumstance elements).
199. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 321 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (explaining that “[t]his formulation combines the policy that accomplices are
equally accountable within the range of their complicity with the policies underlying those
crimes defined according to results”).
200. See, e.g., People v. Abbott, 445 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346–47 (App. Div. 1981). But
cf. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 13.2(e), at 353 & n.120 (citing conflicting cases and noting
that few state legislatures have adopted the Model Penal Code’s approach).
201. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 14.01[A], at 182.
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 414 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985). The only two alternatives apparently envisioned by the drafters, however, were the
ones addressed in the text: to apply the purpose requirement to circumstance elements and
to use the same mens rea rule for both principal and accomplice. See MODEL PENAL CODE
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advantage of providing an opportunity to account for the wide variation
in circumstance elements, both in their nature and their centrality to the
essence of the crime,203 it also opens the door to ad hoc and unprincipled
decisionmaking.204 Accordingly, it is preferable to follow one consistent
approach in choosing the mens rea attached to attendant circumstances.205
To illustrate the impact of the mens rea regime recommended in this
Article, consider the crime of common law burglary. Burglary was
defined by common law as breaking and entering into another person’s
dwelling at night with the intent to commit a felony.206 This description
of the offense contains two distinct conduct elements, both of which are
required. Assume, for example, the principal intended to throw a rock
through the glass door in the back of a home, enabling her to unlock the
door, enter the house, and steal the family jewels. If an accessory supplied
the rock, thinking it would be used to break a window as a cruel prank,
the accessory’s purpose would extend to the breaking but not the entering.
Likewise, an accomplice who thought the plan was to enter the home
through the open front door would have the purpose to enter but not to
break.207 Under this Article’s suggested approach, complicity would
require proof of purpose regarding each conduct element so that neither
of these defendants would be guilty of burglary on an accomplice liability

§ 2.06 cmt. at 311 n.37 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). Note that the Model
Penal Code likewise left unresolved the mental state required vis-à-vis circumstance
elements to support a conviction for solicitation and conspiracy. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 5.02 cmt. at 371 n.23, 5.03 cmt. at 409–14 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
203. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 414 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (reasoning that “[t]oo many variations, many of which cannot be
foreseen with any confidence, [can] be expected to arise”).
204. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 240 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (acknowledging the temptation to create “artificial constraints on the
concept of conduct” in order to “yield sensible conclusions as a matter of penal policy”).
205. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 1, at 739 (calling the Model Penal Code’s
ambiguity on this issue the “greatest flaw” in its accomplice provision).
206. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 63 (William S. Hein & Co. photo. reprint 1986) (1797); DRESSLER, supra note
10, § 27.02[F], at 377. But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (defining burglary to require simply an unlicensed entry into a building
in order to commit a crime, with the gravity of the offense increased if, for example, the
defendant entered a residence at night or was armed with a deadly weapon).
207. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. at 68 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985).
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theory.208 The first would have the requisite intent for a property damage
offense and the second for trespass, but neither would have the purpose to
assist the crime of burglary.
In addition, common law burglary arguably has three circumstance
elements: (1) that the building was a dwelling, (2) belonging to another
person, and (3) that the entry into the dwelling occurred at night.209 All three
of these circumstances are material elements of the crime. Although they
may vary in terms of their importance in measuring a defendant’s culpability,
none of them are purely procedural or jurisdictional.210 Rather, each is
grounded in substance—the judgment that unlawfully entering a residence
is a greater intrusion on privacy and security than doing so in a place of
business and that entering is more dangerous and frightening at night than
during the day.211
Under the proposal set forth in this Article, the mens rea an accomplice
must have with respect to these three facts would turn on the distinction
between a crime’s conduct and circumstance elements. If criminal law
defines the actus reus of crimes narrowly, as encompassing simply the
acts of breaking and entering for burglary, the mens rea of purpose would
apply to both the conduct and the circumstance elements. The prosecution
would therefore be required to establish that the accessory wanted the
principal to break and enter, and also knew, believed, or hoped that the
entry would occur at night in the home of another person.
If the line between conduct and circumstance elements is drawn
differently, however, such that the actus reus of burglary is viewed more
broadly as breaking and entering into another person’s residence, then the
purpose requirement would extend only to the conduct element and the
accomplice could be convicted on the same mens rea showing vis-à-vis
the circumstance element needed to convict the principal. The jury would
therefore have to find the entry in fact happened at night212 and the
accomplice wanted the principal to break and enter into another person’s
dwelling.
208. The prosecution would additionally need to satisfy the specific intent requirement
(intent to commit a felony) for each party to the crime. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
209. See DRESSLER, supra note 10, § 9.10[D][3], at 114–15; Simons, supra note 30,
at 469 n.13.
210. For a discussion of the distinction between material and jurisdictional elements,
see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
211. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 cmt. at 67, 80 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
212. See Enker, supra note 151, at 876 (explaining that the time of day was a matter
of strict liability at common law). This element could likewise be included in the description
of the prohibited conduct, although it is considered one of the standard illustrations of an
attendant circumstance. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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Returning full circle to Rosemond and taking the Court at its word that
§ 924(c) consists of two conduct elements, complicity liability should
require proof that the accessory’s purpose extended to both the predicate
offense and the use of a firearm. Under that interpretation of the elements
of the crime, then, the Court erred in allowing a conviction based simply
on the accomplice’s prior knowledge that a weapon would be involved in
a violent or drug trafficking offense. That knowledge could be used to
infer purpose but in and of itself should not be a sufficient basis to sustain
a conviction.
If, on the other hand, § 924(c) is viewed as consisting of a conduct and
a circumstance element, the prosecution’s mens rea burden would depend
on two factors: which part of the statute actually states the circumstance
element, and how broadly or narrowly a crime’s actus reus is conceived.
The ruling in Rosemond would be justifiable, as an initial matter, only if
the statute is read in a counter-textual fashion such that “during and in
relation to” the predicate offense is the conduct element and “uses or
carries a firearm” is the attendant circumstance. Then, second, if criminal
law defines the actus reus broadly—selling drugs, for example—the approach
advocated here would lead to an outcome comparable to Rosemond because
knowledge is the mental state vis-à-vis a firearm necessary to convict a
principal of violating § 924(c).213 If, however, the conduct element is
viewed narrowly—simply selling—this Article would extend the mens
rea of purpose to the circumstance elements as well and therefore would
call for proof that the accomplice knew, believed, or hoped that a firearm
would be involved in the sale of narcotics.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the frequent role that complicity plays in criminal trials across
this country, the confusion surrounding its mens rea requirements is both
surprising and indefensible. The Court’s decision in Rosemond did help
resolve the issues arising in § 924(c) prosecutions, calling for proof of
“active participation in a drug sale” coupled with “prior knowledge of the
gun’s involvement.”214 To be sure, the Court left questions for future
litigation: where to draw the line between active and incidental participants
in the predicate offense; whether a different rule governs § 924(c) cases

213.
214.

See Weiss, supra note 1, at 1382; Robinson, supra note 79, at 785.
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1251 (2014).

169

KINPORTS FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

10/30/2018 9:14 AM

charging that a firearm was brandished or discharged, as opposed to used
or carried; and when an accessory’s awareness of a firearm “comes too
late” to qualify as “advance knowledge.”215
Nevertheless, Rosemond made clear that, despite purporting to adhere
to Peoni’s requirement that accomplices must exhibit purpose with
respect to the principal’s crime, the Court was content with proof of
knowledge—not that knowledge of a weapon could lead to an inference
of purpose, but that it was sufficient in and of itself. Combined with the
Court’s holding that complicity’s actus reus requirement is satisfied by
showing a § 924(c) accessory provided assistance only to the predicate
offense, even if she did nothing to facilitate the weapon, Rosemond expands
§ 924(c) liability to defendants who displayed a striking absence of culpability
with respect to the firearm.
Moving beyond the confines of Rosemond, although the Supreme Court
provided answers to some of the questions plaguing the courts in § 924(c)
cases, the larger issues surrounding mens rea and complicity remain
unresolved, particularly for crimes that require proof of some attendant
circumstance. In order to fulfill the promise of Peoni and ensure that
accomplices acted intentionally with respect to the gravamen of the crime,
the mens rea of purpose should attach to each conduct element of the
offense.
For crimes that contain circumstance elements, the requisite mens rea
should turn on how criminal law conceives the distinction between conduct
and circumstances. If conduct is defined narrowly, limited to the defendant’s
willed movements, then the requirement of purpose should extend to the
attendant circumstances as well—meaning that the prosecution must establish
the accessory knew, believed, or hoped that the circumstances existed. If
conduct is viewed more broadly, the accomplice need only share the same
mens rea vis-à-vis the circumstance elements necessary to convict the
principal. This approach preserves the rationales underlying the law of
complicity’s traditional mandate that accessories must act purposefully
and thereby appropriately limits accomplice liability to those who are
sufficiently culpable with respect to the essence of the underlying crime.

215. Id. For a discussion of these open questions, see supra notes 51, 58, & 79–83
and accompanying text.
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